

VZCZCXRO4177

PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR

DE RUEHMO #2755/01 3131552

ZNY CCCCC ZZH

P 091552Z NOV 09 ZDK CTG OVER A DOZEN SVC REQUESTS

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5346

INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY

RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY

RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 002755

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2019

TAGS: [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [EFIN](#) [RS](#) [MD](#)

SUBJECT: RUSSIAN MFA ON MOLDOVA ELECTIONS, TRANSNISTRIA,
CREDIT

Classified By: Pol M/C Susan Elliott for reasons 1.4 (b), (d)

11. (C) Summary. The MFA said that in late October, Moscow had urged Moldovan Communist Party leader Voronin and presidential hopeful Lupu to compromise in the November 10 Moldovan presidential election, without proposing specific details for any agreement. Still, Russian officials believed the elections would likely fail, causing a repeat parliamentary election and the risk of further polarization. On Transnistria, the MFA said the November 6 talks in Vienna had produced positive outcomes: Moldovan PM Filat emerged as Transnistrian leader Smirnov's negotiating partner, Transnistria agreed to discuss social and economic issues, and new documents were being prepared for agreement. Russia would not withdraw its troops from Transnistria, though. Disbursement of a Russian loan to Chisinau was delayed by the need to set up a bilateral commission that would work out specific projects to fund. End Summary

Presidential election

12. (C) MFA Deputy Director of the Moldova Desk Nikolai Fomin confirmed on November 8 that Russia hosted Moldovan Communist Party leader Vladimir Voronin and Moldovan presidential hopeful Marian Lupu in Moscow on October 30 and 31, respectively. The MFA did not participate in the meetings, which were conducted by the Russian Chief of the Presidential Administration Sergei Naryshkin. Fomin said Naryshkin had in separate meetings urged both politicians to find a compromise in the November 10 presidential election that guaranteed stability and continuity. Fomin added that Naryshkin refrained from proposing specific details for any agreement, as that would have constituted interference in domestic politics.

13. (C) Fomin criticized the EU's handling of the political crisis in Moldova, saying that EU Special Representative for Moldova Kalman Mizsei involved himself in Moldova's internal affairs in a way Russia had consciously chosen not to. He did not think that Russia would object to any U.S. high-level visits or financial assistance to Moldova in the form of MCC projects, as that constituted normal inter-governmental cooperation.

14. (C) Fomin said that Naryshkin's approach conformed to the message Russia gave Moldova when President Medvedev had met with Lupu during the October 9 CIS Summit. Fomin argued that Medvedev had not snubbed Voronin by not meeting with him on that occasion, as Voronin was an opposition politician, whereas Lupu was the presidential aspirant. Naryshkin's Oct 30 meeting with Voronin put all doubts to rest that Russia disfavored Voronin, Fomin opined.

15. (C) While Lupu and Voronin had clearly understood Moscow's interest in maintaining stability and continuity, Fomin doubted that they would actually compromise during the November 10 presidential election. Therefore, the election would most likely fail, causing a repeat parliamentary election in 2010 and the risk of radicalization of the situation in Moldova. The communist party would demonstrate unity in opposing Lupu, Fomin said, while Lupu would be unwilling to compromise, and PM Filat would make his own bid for the presidency. Still, it was unrealistic to assume Filat's ambitions might cause his Liberal Democratic Party to form an alliance with the Communist Party.

Transnistria

16. (C) Fomin said that the November 6 talks in Vienna had shown several positive signs. By underscoring the Prime Minister's constitutional responsibility as chief Moldovan negotiator on Transnistria, Filat emerged as Transnistrian leader Smirnov's negotiating partner, while DPM Osipov and Transnistrian "Foreign Minister" Yastrebchak were the counterparts for technical issues. Fomin also welcomed Transnistria's willingness to negotiate over social and economic issues. He noted Smirnov's insistence that the political process would not be renewed in the "5 plus 2"-like process, which should remain consultative. Fomin finally listed the decision to prepare new documents for agreement as a positive outcome of the talks.

MOSCOW 00002755 002 OF 002

17. (C) Fomin noted without rancor the decision to conduct all further talks in the "5 plus 2" format (which he did not describe as such), and to discontinue further "2 plus 1" meetings between the Moldovan, Transnistrian, and Russian leaders. Moldovan FM Iurie Leanca and FM Sergei Lavrov in a meeting on November 6 had also expressed satisfaction with the resumption of the "5 plus 2" talks.

18. (C) Fomin argued against withdrawing Russian troops from Transnistria. He said their number was so small as to make Russia's presence there symbolic only, although he also claimed that withdrawing them would be destabilizing. Fomin said that the presidentially-agreed mandate governing the troops' presence would be hard to break, while it would be equally difficult to create a new mandate to cover a new international troop presence. Fomin said that the British troops in Cyprus showed that it was possible for a country to simultaneously maintain a troop presence and be accepted as a mediator in the conflict.

Credit

19. (C) Fomin said that Moscow and Chisinau agreed during the CIS Summit to set up a bilateral commission to work out concrete proposals how to use the USD 150 million loan Moldova had requested from Russia. He said the delay in transferring the credit was not linked to the political insecurity in Moldova, but rather was a result of bureaucratic processes in setting up the commission. For example, the new Moldovan government had not yet appointed its delegation head for the commission. The recent IMF decision to disburse USD 590 million to Moldova would strengthen Moldova's economic stability, making it possible for Russia to take its time in allocating its own credit.

Comment

110. (C) After seven months of uncertainty in Moldova's

government formation, Moscow has no more sense than others of what will happen next. Therefore, it is trying to keep its lines open to all major political players, in order to be well-positioned with whomever should emerge the victor.

Beyrle